

INFO	LOG-00	EEB-00	AF-00	AID-00	AMAD-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00
	INL-00	C-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	WHA-00	PERC-00
	DS-00	DHSE-00	EUR-00	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	VCI-00	H-00
	TEDE-00	INR-00	INSE-00	IO-00	L-00	CAC-00	MOFM-00
	MOF-00	M-00	VCIE-00	NEA-00	NRC-00	NRRC-00	NSAE-00
	ISN-00	OCS-00	OES-00	OIC-00	OIG-00	OMB-00	NIMA-00
	PA-00	PM-00	P-00	SCT-00	ISNE-00	DOHS-00	FMPC-00
	SP-00	IRM-00	SS-00	T-00	NCTC-00	BBG-00	R-00
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 TAGS: [PREL](#) [PARM](#) [KNNP](#) [MOPS](#) [KN](#) [KS](#) [CH](#)
 SUBJECT: PRC/DPRK: CHINESE MFA ON UNSC RESOLUTION RE DPRK
 NUCLEAR TEST

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson.
 Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY

11. (C) China wanted any UN Security Council resolution responding to the DPRK's May 25 nuclear test to be measured, be made in the interest of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and support the denuclearization of the Peninsula and the Six-Party Talks, MFA North American Affairs DG Zheng Zeguang told A/DCM May 26. Zheng welcomed a U.S. team to Beijing to discuss the international response to the test. Separately, MFA International Organizations and Conferences Department Deputy Director General Li Junhua told U.S., British and French Embassy representatives that North Korea's May 25 nuclear test had been a complete "surprise" to Beijing. China had told the DPRK May 25 that its nuclear test was a violation of UNSC Resolution 1718 and had destabilized the Korean Peninsula. Li said Beijing was open to toughening the existing sanctions regime but stressed that any action taken by the Security Council should facilitate denuclearization and should not harm the North Korean people or affect humanitarian assistance. Li signaled Chinese reluctance to add individual DPRK leaders to the sanctions list or add language that would mandate the interdiction of suspected shipments. Li said the DPRK's May 25-26 short-range missile launches were not prohibited by UNSCR 1718 and therefore not legally subject to the sanctions regime. End Summary.

12. (C) In a May 25 meeting at the MFA with A/DCM, North American and Oceanian Affairs Department Director General Zheng Zeguang expressed appreciation for our close cooperation and coordination on all things DPRK. Zheng said that he had listened in on last night's phone call from the Secretary to Foreign Minister Yang in Hanoi and had read a transcript of the Deputy Secretary's conversation with Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei. Zheng reiterated PRC desire that a UN Security Council resolution aimed at the DPRK be measured, be made in the interest of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and support the denuclearization of the Peninsula and the Six-Party Talks. Noting that the Secretary had told FM Yang that the U.S. intended to dispatch a team to Japan, the ROK and China to discuss next steps, Zheng indicated that China would welcome such a team and asked us to relay any logistics information about the team's plans and make-up as soon as possible.

China Conveys Strong Dismay and Opposition to DPRK

13. (C) MFA International Organizations and Conferences Deputy Director General Li Junhua told PolOff, British Political Counselor Peter Wilson, and French Political Counselor Bernard Lelarge on the evening of May 26 that North Korea's nuclear test on May 25 had been a "surprise." The DPRK government had informed the PRC Embassy in Pyongyang a mere 25 minutes before the actual nuclear test. Pyongyang had earlier threatened to conduct a second nuclear test, but Beijing, like the rest of the international community, had not expected a test to happen so suddenly, said Li.

14. (C) Acting Foreign Minister Wang Guangya had summoned the DPRK Ambassador to the MFA on May 25 and conveyed China's strong dismay and opposition to North Korea's nuclear test, said Li. Wang told the DPRK Ambassador that the nuclear test was a clear violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1718 and had destabilized the Korean Peninsula. China asked North Korea to recommit to the Six-Party Talks and to the goal of denuclearization, reported Li.

UNSC Resolution: "Everything is Possible"...

15. (C) When asked if China would support toughening the existing sanctions regime, Li replied that "everything is possible." North Korea's nuclear test was "cause for further sanctions," and "most members want to see tough measures," he added. Japan was in the process of drafting a resolution for discussion by the Security Council, and Beijing was prepared to have substantive discussion in New York regarding Tokyo's proposed language. Li requested details from Washington regarding the additional measures or sanctions that the United States would be interested in pursuing in Security Council discussions. PolOff agreed to convey the request to Washington.

16. (C) Wilson and PolOff stressed the importance of UN Security Council unity in its reaction to the North Korean nuclear test and of making clear to Pyongyang that there were consequences to its actions. Regarding the timing of the UNSC resolution, Li said he expected a decision to be made quickly but emphasized that it was important not to sacrifice conciseness for speed. The Chinese government would need to consult all agencies, including the military, before supporting any resolution, said Li. It would not be an easy thing to support a resolution against China's neighbor, he added.

...With a Few Exceptions

17. (C) DDG Li noted that Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi had told Secretary Clinton earlier in the day that any signals sent by the UN Security Council should be aimed at facilitating denuclearization, maintaining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and protecting the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula. Any Security Council action should be clearly defined so that it did not harm the North Korean people or affect humanitarian assistance to the DPRK, stressed Li. The international community had to bear in mind that North Korea wanted indirect or direct recognition of its nuclear status. The Security Council action, in whatever form it ultimately took, should facilitate denuclearization and not run counter to this objective, he said.

18. (C) Li said that during previous discussions on UNSC Resolutions 1695 and 1718, there had been proposals to include individual North Korean leaders on the sanctions list. This could be a political hurdle, he warned. Asked about Seoul's announcement that it would join the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Li responded that PSI was extremely "sensitive" to Beijing. China would not support language in a resolution that would mandate naval interdiction of suspected shipments, as this might trigger unexpected confrontations in China's coastal areas.

DPRK Next Steps?

¶9. (C) China hoped North Korea would make a public recommitment to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Li said, noting that he was not optimistic that this would be possible anytime soon. Beijing, which did not have any additional information from Pyongyang about further tests, said the Chinese government would not be surprised if North Korea conducted additional nuclear or missile tests. The Six-Party Talks would likely be shelved for a few months, predicted Li.

Missiles

¶10. (C) DDG Li said that the short-range missiles the DPRK launched May 25 and 26 were not prohibited under UN Security Council Resolution 1718 and therefore not subject, legally speaking, to the sanctions regime.

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